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A	History	of	Brexit	in	47	Objects:	The	Journey	to	2016
In	the	second	of	his	nine-part	history	of	Brexit,	Tim	Oliver	looks	at	six	objects	that	tell	the	history	of	how	Britain
found	itself	facing	a	referendum.
We	begin	our	history	of	Brexit	with	six	objects	that	explain	the	history	of	Britain’s	part	in	European	integration.	They
are	objects	that	touch	on	the	themes	of	war,	strategy,	legitimacy,	trade,	integration,	and	diplomacy.
Object	1:	The	Grave	of	the	Unknown	Warrior,	Westminster	Abbey
Regrettably,	war	has	often	defined	relations	not	only	between	Britain	and	the	rest	of	Europe	but	between	all
European	states.	It	continues	to	do	so	today.	Of	the	many	graves	and	memorials	found	across	the	British	Isles	that
commemorate	conflicts	in	Europe,	the	most	famous	is	to	be	found	in	Westminster	Abbey.	Of	the	3,500	illustrious
(and	in	some	cases	notorious)	souls	buried	in	the	abbey,	pride	of	place	is	given	to	that	of	an	unknown	British	soldier
killed	on	a	European	battlefield	in	the	First	World	War.	It	is	a	reminder	that	despite	Britain’s	island	status	it	has
never	been	able	to	separate	itself	from	the	goings-on	in	the	rest	of	the	continent.	As	Winston	Churchill	(we’ll	come
back	to	him	frequently)	so	neatly	put	it	during	the	First	World	War:	‘Europe	is	where	the	weather	comes	from.’
In	facing	the	European	weather,	every	European	state,	Britain	included,	has	pursued	numerous	alliances	and
treaties	and	when	they	have	failed	have	pursued	equally	numerous	bloody	wars,	divisions	and	fallings	out.	Europe
after	the	devastation	of	two	world	wars	saw	numerous	attempts	to	manage	that	instability.	What	we	now	know	as
the	European	Union	is	one	of	the	most	prominent	attempts,	but	by	no	means	the	only	one	in	what	has	become	a
complex	and	sometimes	confusing	set	of	overlapping	organisations	and	relationships.	Changes	in	bilateral	relations
(such	as	between	France	and	Germany),	multilateral	conferences,	intergovernmental	organisations	such	as	the
Council	of	Europe	and	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	trading	arrangements	such	as	the	European	Free
Trade	Association	and	numerous	security	setups	(most	obviously	NATO)	now	unite	–	or	at	least	try	to	–	a	continent
long	defined	by	divisions	that	too	often	led	to	war.
Justifying	and	interpreting	Britain’s	approach	to	these	European	alliances	and	relationships	has	never	been
straightforward,	especially	when	it	comes	to	the	EU.	But	such	relationships	have	never	been	straightforward	for	any
European	country,	all	of	whom	have	been	scarred	by	Europe’s	many	conflicts.	As	with	any	memorial	or	monument
put	up	anywhere	to	those	past	European	conflicts,	the	history	the	British	people	draw	from	the	Grave	of	the
Unknown	Warrior	is	political.	It	can	be	seen	as	a	symbol	of	the	sacrifices	necessary	to	ensure	independence,
sovereignty,	justice	and	freedom.	It	can	also	be	seen	a	symbol	of	the	loss	of	life	by	millions	of	unknown	souls
because	of	the	failures	of	the	kings,	statesmen	and	generals	who	across	Europe	are	usually	buried	in	hallowed
places	such	as	Westminster	Abbey.
Object	2:	The	Allies	Statue,	Bond	Street
Europe	might	be,	as	Churchill	put	it,	‘where	the	weather	comes	from’	but	a	long-standing	strategy	of	successive	UK
governments	has	been	to	look	beyond	it	for	assistance	and	support.	Many	of	the	other	unknown	British	servicemen
and	women	killed	in	the	two	world	wars	lie	buried	in	the	23,000	Commonwealth	War	Graves	found	across	the
world.	British	men	and	women	might	make	up	a	majority	of	those	resting	in	such	gravesites,	but	by	their	sides	lie
Canadians,	Australians,	Indians,	Kenyans	and	hundreds	of	thousands	more	from	across	the	former	British	Empire
and	Commonwealth.	London,	the	former	imperial	capital,	hosts	numerous	memorials	to	their	sacrifices	in	the	aid	of
the	UK.	As	we	turn	to	later	in	the	series,	the	power	and	attachment	to	the	empire	and	Commonwealth	remains	a
powerful	one.	But	it	is	not	only	linked	to	the	Commonwealth	that	has	shaped	British	approaches	to	Europe.
The	relationship	with	the	USA	has	played	an	equally	powerful	but	often	confusing	part	in	Britain’s	relations	with	the
rest	of	Europe.	Located	on	the	upmarket	Bond	St	in	West	London,	the	Allies	Statue	perfectly	encapsulates	this.
Unveiled	in	1995,	it	commemorates	the	UK-US	‘special	relationship’	in	the	form	of	the	two	Second	World	War
leaders,	Churchill	and	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt.	Sat	at	either	end	of	a	bench,	the	two	relaxed	smiling	figures	are
separated	by	a	space	the	viewer	can	sit	in.	It’s	approachable	and	located	on	one	of	London’s	busiest	shopping
streets.
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The	‘special	relationship’	however,	has	always	been	fraught	with	more	difficulties	for	both	sides	than	the	statue	of
the	two	smiling	leaders	suggests.	First	given	prominence	by	Churchill	in	a	speech	in	1946,	he	talked	of	‘a	special
relationship	between	the	British	Commonwealth	and	Empire	and	the	United	States.’	This	was	about	Britain	as	a
global	empire	and	equal	of	the	USA,	something	now	overlooked.	What	is	not	overlooked,	at	least	officially	by	UK
governments,	is	that	a	central	UK	goal	of	the	relationship	has	been	to	keep	the	USA	committed	to	Europe.	Britain’s
key	strategic	lesson	from	two	world	wars	was	that	it	needed	to	rely	on	outside	support,	especially	the	USA,	if	it	was
to	face	hostile	and	uncertain	European	weather.	For	the	USA,	the	UK	remains	an	important,	if	diminished,	ally.	But
for	both,	not	least	the	USA,	the	relationship	is	one	of	several	important	(read:	special)	relationships.	It	has	left
successive	prime	ministers	and	presidents	struggling	with	a	series	of	contradictions.	British	prime	ministers	have
sought	to	use	the	relationship	to	remain	apart	from	the	rest	of	Europe	while	also	seeking	increased	European
cooperation	to	boost	Europe	–	and	therefore	Britain’s	–	standing	with	the	USA	and	ability	to	stand	apart	when
needed.	US	presidents	meanwhile	have	supported	European	integration	(including	British	membership)	so	Europe
can	speak	more	clearly	with	a	single	voice,	while	being	ambivalent	about	Europe	–	Britain	included	–	becoming	a
strategic	competitor.
The	warmth	and	brotherly	feel	of	the	Allies	Statue	certainly	contrasts	with	the	statues	found	elsewhere	to	many	of
Britain’s	allies	from	the	Second	World	War.	The	statue	of	France’s	General	de	Gaulle	stands	proudly	on	Carlton
Gardens	in	the	heart	of	St	James’s,	not	far	from	where	he	led	the	Free	French.	Unveiled	only	two	years	before	the
Allies	Statue,	its	more	formal,	frosty	and	largely	overlooked	nature	tells	of	an	Anglo-French	relationship	that	has
been	more	brittle,	suspicious	and	lacked	the	warmth	of	the	UK-US	relationship.	De	Gaulle	himself	famously	twice
rejected	Britain’s	attempts	to	join	European	integration,	with	Britain’s	continued	close	relationship	with	the	USA
used	as	part	of	his	justification.	He	might	have	been	protecting	French	interests	and	his	vetoes	have	distracted
attention	from	a	very	close	French-UK	relationship.	But	that	cold,	calculating	decision	highlighted	a	post-war	relative
decline	for	Britain	that	close	personal	relations	symbolised	in	the	Allies	Statue	could	distract	from	but	not	hide.
Object	3:	A	Ballot	Paper	from	the	1975	Referendum
Britain’s	eventual	membership	of	the	then	European	Economic	Community	was	achieved	on	a	third	attempt.	It	was
hardly	an	auspicious	start.	Britain’s	membership	has	from	the	start	been	overshadowed	by	several	mistakes	and
problems,	not	least	when	it	came	to	the	issue	of	the	legitimacy	of	the	relationship.	Britain’s	aloofness	followed	by	de
Gaulle’s	vetoes	meant	Britain	joined	an	organisation	whose	institutions,	budget	and	policies	had	been	set	by	the
founding	members.	It	meant	a	series	of	painful	adjustments	for	the	UK	also	facing	the	equally	painful	adjustments
of	post-war	relative	decline.	The	decision	to	join	was	also	not	widely	embraced.	Instead,	it	was	seen	as	a	necessary
step	to	deal	with	decline	and	therefore	a	transactional	relationship	focused	on	trade	and	business.	No	surprise	then
that	questions	of	popular	support	and	party	unity	haunted	the	topic	from	the	very	start.
The	ballot	paper	shown	is	from	the	1975	referendum	on	Britain’s	membership,	which	was	a	product	of	this
inauspicious	start	to	British	membership.	Called	by	Labour	prime	minister	Harold	Wilson,	the	referendum	was	his
way	of	managing	both	internal	Labour	party	differences	that	reached	into	his	cabinet	and	a	degree	of	public	disquiet
at	UK	participation	in	an	organisation	whose	membership	had	been	approved	by	parliament	instead	of	the	people
as	happened	in	several	other	European	states	(with	Norway,	for	example,	voting	via	referendum	not	to	join	in
1972).	Held	on	the	5th	June	1975,	the	referendum	was	preceded	by	a	renegotiation	of	the	UK’s	membership.	The
government	confidently	presented	this	as	a	successful	renegotiation	even	if	little	of	substance	changed.	The	result,
on	the	other	hand,	appeared	to	confidently	assert	British	support	for	membership	with	17,378,581	of	the	ballots
(67%)	cast	for	‘Yes’	to	whether	‘the	UK	should	stay	in	the	European	Community	(Common	Market).’
It	soon	became	clear,	however,	that	the	referendum	had	been	a	temporary	solution.	Labour	split	in	the	early	1980s,
in	part	over	differences	about	Europe,	and	opinion	polling	showed	the	public	soon	moved	towards	a	more	sceptical
view	of	UK	membership.	Arguments	have	persisted	over	what	was	offered,	with	the	meaning	of	‘Common	Market’
being	the	topic	of	much	debate.	Threatening	to	leave	also	pointed	to	Britain’s	isolation.	Neither	Denmark	or	Ireland,
who	had	also	joined	in	1973,	was	tempted	to	follow	the	UK	if	it	voted	to	withdraw.
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That	the	referendum,	therefore,	offered	only	a	temporary	reprieve	for	Wilson,	who	was	able	to	retire	shortly
afterwards,	has	not	discouraged	other	party	leaders	from	attempting	to	mimic	his	approach.	Whether	it	was	John
Major,	Tony	Blair,	Gordon	Brown	or	David	Cameron	promising	referendums	on	membership	of	the	Euro,	of	the
European	Constitution	and	Lisbon	Treaty,	or	eventually	on	membership	itself,	the	offer	of	a	referendum	has	been
used	repeatedly	as	a	way	to	placate	(or	at	least	attempt	to)	disgruntled	backbenchers	and	growing	public	unease.
That	their	use	or	promise	would	lead	to	new	and	difficult	questions,	not	least	surrounding	legitimacy,	in
constitutional,	political,	economic,	social	and	diplomatic	matters	was	all	too	easily	overlooked.
Object	4:	A	Eurostar
A	common	claim	about	the	1975	referendum	was	that	the	British	people	voted	to	remain	in	a	‘Common	Market’	and
not	partake	in	some	form	of	political	union.	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	securing	access	to	the	economic	benefits	of
European	integration,	and	being	able	to	shape	these	from	within,	was	a	widely	accepted	aim	of	UK	membership.
Britain	had	tried	to	offer	an	alternative	setup	in	the	form	of	the	European	Free	Trade	Association.	Compared	to	the
European	Community,	however,	it	lacked	unity	and	momentum.	Embracing	the	European	Community,	at	least	in	a
transactional	business-like	way,	might	not	have	led	the	British	to	embrace	the	idea	of	European	integration	in	ways
other	Member	States	did.	It	did,	however,	provide	a	foundation	on	which	to	build	the	UK’s	biggest	contribution	to
European	integration:	the	Single	Market.
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This	series	will	include	a	number	of	objects	that	explain	the	single	market	and	the	economic	links	that	have
developed	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.	There	could	be	no	better	object	to	start	with,	however,	than	the	high-speed
train	that	connects	London	with	several	other	European	cities	via	the	Channel	Tunnel.	First	proposed	in	the	early
nineteenth	century,	it	was	not	until	the	mid-1980s	that	a	successful	attempt	at	constructing	a	link	began.	Today,	the
50km/31mile	long	tunnel	carries	millions	of	passengers	and	tons	of	freight.	Passengers	catching	a	Eurostar	from
London’s	refurbished	St	Pancras	International	station	can	travel	to	16	stations	ranging	from	Marseille	in	the	South
of	France	to	Amsterdam	in	the	Netherlands.	Each	year	millions	of	others	make	use	of	the	car	and	coach	link	while
millions	of	tons	of	freight	also	flow	through	it.	It	has	become	a	normal	part	of	the	links	between	Britain	and	the	rest
of	Europe.
The	idea	of	a	tunnel	had	long	been	overshadowed	not	only	by	doubts	about	the	engineering	and	costs.	The	security
threats	it	posed	were	also	a	prominent	concern	and	have	remained	so.	Earlier	plans	for	a	tunnel	or	crossing	were
repeatedly	thwarted	by	concerns	it	could	be	captured	by	a	hostile	force	who	would	use	it	for	an	invasion.	The
possibility	of	France	or	another	European	state	invading	might	have	disappeared,	but	security	concerns	about
diseases	(the	spread	of	rabies	was	a	prominent	concern	when	the	tunnel	was	being	dug)	and	illegal	immigration
continue	to	surround	the	tunnel.
The	Eurostar	also	points	to	some	of	the	economic	problems	and	differences	that	have	dogged	UK-EU	relations.
Differences	between	Britain	and	France	over	how	to	pay	for	the	scheme	allude	to	wider	differences	in	economic
approaches	between	the	UK	and	the	other	EU	Member	States.	Despite	the	economic	gains,	Britain’s	very
commitment	to	the	scheme	has	sometimes	been	in	doubt.	An	earlier	proposal	for	a	tunnel	was	cancelled	due	to
doubts	surrounding	the	1975	referendum.	The	economic	gains	themselves	have	not	always	lived	up	to	the
promises	made.	Britain’s	membership	of	the	EU	coincided	with	the	end	of	the	post-war	economic	boom	that	had
helped	ease	and	justify	the	earlier	stages	of	integration.
This	is	not	to	say	that	Britain	did	not	gain	economically	from	membership	of	the	EU	and	its	Single	Market.	The
gains,	however,	hid	that	Britain	had	long	traded	heavily	with	the	rest	of	Europe	with	the	growth	in	British	trade	in	the
post-war	era	being	in	part	a	realignment	after	a	period	or	global	protectionism	and	imperial	trade	preferences.	But
that	trade	–	or	the	opportunities	offered	–	has	not	benefited	everyone	in	Britain	the	same	way,	or	at	least	appeared
to	do	so	recently.	That	London	had	a	high-speed	train	link	to	Paris,	Brussels	and	the	South	of	France	long	before	it
is	planned	to	have	one	to	Birmingham,	Glasgow	or	Scotland	has	not	passed	unnoticed	elsewhere	in	the	UK.
Promises	have	been	repeatedly	made,	not	least	when	the	project’s	debts	have	needed	restructuring,	that	Eurostar
trains	would	connect	towns	and	cities	outside	of	London	and	the	South	East	to	the	rest	of	Europe.	Such	trains	have
yet	to	arrive.
Object	5:	A	€1	coin
Radio	4	and	the	British	Museum’s	History	of	the	World	in	100	Objects	includes	several	entries	focused	on	coins.
Coins	can	tell	us	a	lot	about	the	history	of	human	civilisation.	They	can	tell	us	about	economies,	wealth,	trade
patterns,	technological	advancements	and	the	spread	of	human	civilisation.	They	also	tell	us	about	authority,	power
and,	crucially,	trust	in	that	authority	and	power	to	uphold	laws,	pay	(and	enforce)	debts,	and	keep	the	peace.	Like
any	currencies,	the	Euro,	the	EU’s	single	currency,	and	the	British	Pound	Sterling	can	tell	us	a	lot	about	the	power,
authority,	and	trust	that	exists	within	and	between	the	EU	and	the	UK.
The	Euro	is	the	most	significant	change	in	the	international	monetary	system	since	the	US	decision	to	end
convertibility	of	the	dollar	to	gold	that	led	to	the	collapse	of	the	Bretton	Woods	system	in	1971.	The	decision	to
abolish	the	currencies	of	eleven	Member	States,	starting	in	1999	and	eventually	covering	nineteen	Member	States,
means	that	today	343	million	people	buy	and	sell	goods	and	services	using	one	currency.	That	currency	is	also	now
the	world’s	second-largest	reserve	currency.	Before	its	introduction,	Europe	was	home	to	a	multitude	of	currencies
ranging	from	Germany’s	Deutschmark	to	Slovakia’s	koruna.	A	single	currency	to	replace	them	had	been	an
ambition	of	some	from	the	very	earliest	stages	of	European	integration.	For	some,	a	currency	was	a	stepping	stone
towards	a	political	union,	perhaps	a	United	States	of	Europe.	For	others,	it	was	a	technical	and	much-needed
means	by	which	to	improve	the	operation	of	European	economies	and	protect	them	against	the	uncertainties	of	an
unstable	global	financial	system.	After	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	reunification	of	Germany	it	also	became	the
means	by	which	Germany	pooled	its	currency	with	other	European	states	so	as	to	assure	them	that	Berlin	sought	a
‘European	Germany’	not	a	‘German	Europe’.
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Britain’s	decision	not	to	join	the	Euro	was	far	from	straightforward	and	offers	several	insights	into	the	history	of
Brexit.	As	a	leading	proponent	of	the	Single	Market,	successive	UK	governments	had	been	supportive	of	efforts	to
remove	trading	barriers	to	create	a	more	open	market	across	the	EU.	What	British	decision	makers	were	less	keen
to	admit	was	that	this	would	inevitably	require	supranational	oversight	and	enforcement	(to	which	we	return	in	later
objects).	If	pushed	further,	it	would	also	require	some	forms	of	monetary	and	fiscal	policies	to	coordinate	and
manage	the	collective	European	economy.	If	British	businesses,	especially	in	the	City	of	London,	were	to	fully
benefit	from	this	then	British	participation	might	be	needed.	A	single	currency	could	also	form	a	core	to	the	EU,
meaning	that	if	British	decision	makers	wanted	to	fully	participate	and	shape	EU	politics	then	they	might	have	to
give	up	the	Pound	Sterling	as	the	necessary	price	for	a	seat	at	the	top	table.
More	than	anything,	British	decision	makers	and	the	public	more	broadly	also	struggled	with	an	issue	that
underpins	any	currency:	trust.	The	Pound	Sterling’s	ejection	in	1992	from	the	European	Exchange	Rate	Mechanism
(ERM),	by	which	European	countries	were	attempting	to	stabilise	their	exchange	rates,	might	have	been	because
the	value	of	the	Pound	Sterling	was	too	high	leaving	it	vulnerable	to	financial	speculators.	But	it	shattered	an
already	fragile	faith	in	the	EU	amongst	some	in	the	Conservative	party,	with	Germany	especially	the	subject	of
much	animosity.	Later	predictions	that	by	not	joining	the	Euro	Britain,	and	especially	the	City	of	London,	would	be
badly	hurt	turned	out	to	be	far	from	the	mark.	London	continued	to	grow,	eventually	dominating	areas	such	as	Euro-
denominated	trades.	This	failed	prediction	of	economic	pain	would	be	much	repeated	by	the	Leave	campaigns
during	the	2016	referendum.	The	crises	that	have	afflicted	the	Eurozone	since	2009	have	also	helped	weakened
British	faith	and	trust.	So	toxic	did	the	Euro	become	in	Britain	that	in	the	2015	referendum	on	Scottish
independence	many	supporters	of	Scottish	independence	were	keen	to	distance	themselves	from	the	idea	that	an
independent	Scotland	would	have	to	join	the	Euro.	Instead	the	Pound	Sterling,	which	also	brings	with	it	a	history	of
empire	and	power,	has	grown	as	a	symbol	of	British	identity.	UKIP	went	so	far	as	to	adopt	it	as	part	of	its	symbol.
Less	sure,	however,	have	been	the	predictions	made	by	some,	not	least	in	Britain,	that	the	Euro	is	doomed	to	fail
because	the	absence	of	political	and	economic	bonds	make	it	a	currency	without	a	state.	In	something	of	a	twist,
Britain’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU	might	have	allowed	the	EU	to	move	forward	in	building	those	bonds	and	creating
that	state.
Object	6:	Translator’s	Headphones	from	the	European	Council	Chamber
The	EU	is	complex,	sometimes	cumbersome,	and	can	come	across	as	distant,	technocratic	and	elite-driven.	To	be
fair,	the	same	is	said	of	the	UK	government	or	the	government	of	any	modern	state.	What	makes	the	EU	unique	is
its	hybrid	nature:	part	state,	part	international	organisation.	The	EU’s	business	is,	therefore,	a	strange	mix	of
diplomacy	and	the	high	politics	of	war	and	peace,	while	also	being	the	bread-and-butter	issues	associated	with
routine	domestic	politics.	As	mentioned	earlier	when	discussing	the	Grave	of	the	Unknown	Warrior,	Europe’s	peace
and	politics	(at	all	levels)	has	been	shaped	by	a	multitude	of	organisations	and	treaties	of	which	the	EU	is	the	most
prominent.	They	reflect	that	for	post-war	Europeans,	‘jaw-jaw	is	always	better	than	to	war-war’	(Churchill,	again).
When	it	comes	to	‘jaw-jaw’	the	role	of	the	translator	should	never	be	overlooked.	With	24	official	languages,	the	EU
goes	far	and	beyond	the	language	diversity	and	challenges	faced	by	other	international	organisations	or	states	with
several	official	languages.	The	main	working	languages	might	be	English,	French	and	German	(with	English	the
most	widely	spoken)	but	visit	any	official	EU	website	and	you’ll	be	able	to	read,	and	sometimes	listen	to	EU
documents	and	debates	in	any	of	the	official	languages.	It	fits	the	EU’s	motto	of	‘united	in	diversity.’	Critics	have
long	argued	that	such	diversity	is	actually	a	weakness.	They	claim	too	much	is	lost	in	translation	to	make	effective
governing	possible.	EU	citizens	might	hold	common	passports	and	rights	to	free	movement,	but	the	ability	to	do	so
is	constrained	by	cultural	and	especially	language	barriers.	In	a	world	where	swift	decisions	are	necessary,	the	EU
can	be	slow,	cumbersome	and	bureaucratic.	The	EU’s	defenders,	however,	argue		that	the	constant	translating,
internal	negotiating,	and	the	numerous	institutions	and	decision	makers	that	must	be	consulted	(including	between
Euro	and	non-Euro	members)	makes	the	EU	a	powerful	negotiating	machine	that	can	overwhelm	its	opponents	in
negotiations	on	trade	or	other	matters.
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Britain’s	own	sometimes	difficult	relationship	with	European	integration	has	been	due	to	more	than	overcoming
language	barriers	by	a	country	with	a	famously	monolingual	citizenry.	The	EU’s	more	consensus	style	of	politics
that	focuses	on	negotiations,	translations	and	compromises	to	make	the	EU	work	contrasts	with	the	more
majoritarian	system	of	winner	takes	all,	single	party	government	politics	found	in	Westminster.	It	means	a	more
confrontational	approach,	including	wielding	the	UK’s	veto,	was	sometimes	taken	by	UK	governments	and
politicians	even	when	this	left	the	UK	isolated.	That	doesn’t	mean	the	UK	was	ineffective	in	getting	what	it	wanted.
British	officials	and	MEPs	(until,	that	is,	the	arrival	of	large	numbers	of	UKIP	MEPs)	were	regularly	rated	as
amongst	the	hardest	working	and	most	effective	in	EU	policy	making.	UK	governments	negotiated	two
renegotiations	of	the	UK’s	membership	(in	1975	and	2016),	a	budgetary	rebate,	and	opt-outs	from	the	Euro	and
some	areas	of	justice	and	home	affairs	cooperation.	They	successfully	pushed	on	matters	ranging	from	the	Single
Market	to	EU	enlargement	in	such	a	way	that	French	Eurosceptics	once	bemoaned	the	‘Britishisation’	of	the	EU.
Sometimes	the	UK’s	objections	hid	those	of	other	Member	States.	No	surprise	then	that	the	UK	was	labelled	‘an
awkward	partner.’
In	2015-16	the	EU’s	ability	to	tolerate	that	awkwardness	reached	a	limit.	It	was	then	that	David	Cameron	had	to
deliver	on	a	2013	promise	he	made	to	an	increasingly	Eurosceptic	Conservative	Party	that	he	would	renegotiate	the
UK’s	membership,	which	would	then	be	put	to	the	British	people	in	an	in-out	referendum.	Perhaps	Britain’s
increasingly	special	demands	and	treatment	led	him	and	others	to	believe	that	Britain	could	keep	asking	for	more
and	the	EU’s	politics	of	consensus	would	accommodate	it.	Perhaps	something	was	lost	in	translation	as	British	and
EU	decision	makers	struggled	to	understand	each	others	politics.	Whatever	the	merits	of	the	renegotiation
Cameron	secured,	the	vote	that	followed	it	to	leave	the	EU	meant	British	officials	soon	found	themselves	back	in
negotiations	with	the	EU.	This	time,	however,	instead	of	negotiating	as	an	insider,	the	officials	found	themselves
facing	the	EU	negotiating	machine	as	a	(soon	to	be)	outsider.
In	the	next	part	of	the	series,	we’ll	turn	to	the	story	of	why	the	Leave	campaign	won	the	referendum	by	looking	at
objects	that	include	the	Vote	Leave	bus,	Nigel	Farage’s	coat,	and	a	Wetherspoon’s	beermat.
If	you’d	like	to	suggest	an	object	for	this	history	of	Brexit	then	please	do	so	through	the	comments	section	below	or
by	email	(t.l.oliver@lboro.ac.uk).	At	the	end	of	this	nine-part	series	I’ll	publish	a	selection	of	the	objects	you	suggest.
Thank	you	to	those	of	you	who	have	already	done	so.
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